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INTRODUCTION

Developments in criminal law in 19711 were relatively low-keyed
in comparison to recent years. Perhaps the most significant and controversial United States Supreme Court decision was Harris v. New
York' which recognized a substantial exception to the application of
L For purposes of convenience, coverage has been limited to those decisions that appeared in advance sheets of the National Reporter System during 1971. As a result, some 1970
decisions are the subject of discussion, and, conversely, a number of decisions rendered during
the past year were not yet published. In the latter case, some decisions had appeared in
abbreviated form in the CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER (hereinaftet cited CRIM. L. REP.), and these
are frequently noted under appropriate headings.
2. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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Miranda.3 Further pronouncements were made by the Court concerning the practice of working off fines4 and the right of indigent
defendants to transcripts. 5 United States v. White' reaffirmed the
approval of the Court of the use of secret agents in law enforcement. 7
Finally, in Santobello v. New York8 the Court considered the legal
effect of an unfulfilled promise following a bargained plea of guilty.'
II.
A.

OFFENSES

Against Person
1. Homicide.

If an individual fails to accomplish a criminal act because of an
impossibility, he cannot be convicted of the substantive offense. 0
Thus, for example, where the accused intends to steal the book of
another but takes a book that belongs to himself, the crime of larceny
has not been committed. Impossibility as a defense to a charge of first
degree murder was potentially present in Bailey v. State." The deceased and one of the defendants had participated in a dice game
following which the deceased had accused the defendant of cheating
him and shot him in the arm. The following day, the defendant and
his father were walking with the deceased and another. The father
took a pistol from his pocket and shot the deceased in the head. He
then handed the pistol to the defendant, remarked of the incident of
the previous day, and said, "Now you kill him." Defendant shot the
deceased several times, then remarked, "Say, I told you all I would
kill him. There he lays." The defendant and his father were convicted
of first degree murder. 2 Had it been shown that the act of the father
3. See pp. 280-83 infra.
4. See pp. 258-59 infra.
5. See pp. 259-61 infra.
6. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
7. See pp. 266-68 infra.
8. 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971).
9. See p. 271 infra.
10. Whether a conviction of attempt may be sustained will depend upon whether the
impossibility is viewed as legal or factual. See CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES §§ 4.11, 4.12 (7th
ed. 1967).
It. 460 S.W.2d 380 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
12. Both defendants testified at their joint trial, and both stated that the father was not
present at the time of the shooting. The foregoing is the court's summation of the proof of the
prosecution.
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was wholly independent and that the deceased was dead before the
defendant fired the pistol, then the defendant would not be chargeable
with homicide, since the purported victim would not be a "creature
in being" as required by the statute.'" Of course, if an intent to kill
shared by the pair preceded the act, and the first shot fired by the
father was in pursuance of that common intent, then the defendant
was an accessory before the fact, 4 or possibly an aider and abettor, 5
and as such punishable as a principal offender.'
B.

Against Property
1. Larceny

Where an individual is discovered in the possession of recently
stolen property, a presumption arises that he knows the property is
stolen. 7 The propriety of the use of this presumption arose in two
cases. In Poole v. State 8 officers found the defendant in possession
of a stolen automobile about fifteen minutes after and two blocks
from the point of the theft. It had been partially wrecked, and the
defendant was attempting to mount the spare tire. The keys were
found in his pocket. The court held that the presumption was sufficient to rebut the declaration of the defendant that he had agreed to
change the tire in exchange for a ride promised him by two unknown
men who had disappeared, and a conviction of grand larceny was
affirmed. 9
2
However, a different result was reached in Thomas v. State 1
where the defendant was convicted of the petit theft of a wheelbarrow.
The connection between the defendant and the wheelbarrow was established by proof that he had sold it to another nearly a month after
13. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2401 (1955).
14. Id. § 39-107.
15. Id. § 39-109.
16. Id. § 39-108, 109. Actually, the court did not address itself to this issue, presumably
because the defendant did not raise it. Indeed, the defendant testified that he fired the fatal
shot and sought to raise the defense of self-defense.
17. See, e.g., Myers v. State, 470 S.W.2d 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Smith v. State,
451 S.W.2d 716 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969); Rayson v. State, 447 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1969). See also Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1970 A CriticalSurvey, 38 TENN. L.
RFv. 182, 189-90 (1971) (hereinafter cited 1970 Survey).
18. 426 S.W.2d 256 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
19. The court was not persuaded by the fact that the owner had reported two men
occupying the vehicle as it was driven from his driveway.
20. 463 S.W.2d 687 (Tenn. 1971).
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the theft. The defendant and two relatives testified in an effort to
explain his possession. The trial judge instructed the jury that the law
presumed the guilt of the possessor "unless the attending fact or other
elements so far overcome the presumption thus raised as to create a
reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury as to the guilt of the defendant."2 1 The court conceded that this was a proper statement of the
law, noting however, that in most jurisdictions such possession was
merely treated as an evidentiary fact tending to establish guilt. While
not prepared to depart from its prior decisions, the court felt that two
circumstances in the present case justified a reversal. First, there was
no evidence connecting the defendant to the offense other than mere
possession. Second, the extended lapse of time between the offense
and the proven possession of the defendant stretched the requirement
that the possession be "recent". While declining to give the term an
objective definition, the court felt it essential that.the jury be more
fully instructed on its meaning. 2
2.

Embezzlement

The proliferation of theft statutes in Tennessee has lead to fine
lines of distinction between various offenses. One such distinction is
found in the requirement that for a charge of embezzlement the
property in question must never have passed through the hands of the
owner; the property must be entrusted to the defendantfor the owner,
not by the owner.2 3 If the latter transfer occurs, the proper charge is
appropriation of property by a person having custody.2 4 In most jurisdictions, either relationship would support a charge of embezzlement. 25 In Briggs v. State2 1 the defendant was a municipal employee
whose responsibility it was to take money from city parking meters
and deliver it to the city treasury. He was charged with embezzlement,2 7 the proof showing that money had been removed from the
21. Id. at 688 (italics deleted).
22. The court quoted 50 AM. JUR. 2d Larceny § 162 (1970): "The test of recency is
whether the interval is so short as to render it morally or reasonably certain that there could
have been no intermediate change of possession."
23. See Hill v.State, 159 Tenn. 297, 17 S.W.2d 913 (1929); State v. Matthews, 143 Tenn.
463, 226 S.W. 203 (1920).
24. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4224 (Supp. 1971).
25. See 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 513 (1957) (hereinafter cited
WHARTON), PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 288 (2d ed. 1969).
26. 463 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
27. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4231 (1955).
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meters and never turned in to the treasury. The conviction was affirmed. The critical question, not discussed by the court, would appear to be whether the money in the parking meters was to be considered constructively in the possession of the employer. If so, then
embezzlement was not the proper charge. If the defendant were a
parking lot attendant and pocketed money paid to him by his clientele, a charge of embezzlement would clearly lie. On the other hand,
if the defendant received the money from a parker, placed it in his
employer's cash register, and later removed it and converted it to his
own use, appropriation of property by a person having custody would
appear the more likely charge. The present case falls between these
examples. The more persuasive resolution would appear to be that the
money in the meter is in the constructive possession of the employer,
if for no better reason than the absence of a credible alternative.
C.

Against Person and Property

1. Robbery
The robbery statute provides that where robbery is accomplished
by the use of a deadly weapon the crime is a capital offense.28 In two
recent cases, the definition of "deadly weapon" came into issue." In
Campbell v. State0 the court rejected the suggestion that an unloaded gun did not qualify as a deadly weapon. 3 In Beaty v. NeiP2
a flare pistol was held to be a deadly weapon on the theory that such
an instrument "fired point blank at a person at close range could
cause death or grievous bodily harm." 33
Robbery is described as an "aggravated larceny"34 and therefore an intent to steal must be present at the time of the taking.3 5 In
Crumsey v. State31 an undercover agent for the police entered a
28. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3901 (Supp. 1971).
29. See Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1968-A CriticalSurvey. 36 TENN. L. REV.
221, 223-25 (1969) (hereinafter cited 1968 Survey).
30. 464 S.W.2d 334 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
31. The court relied on Turner v. State, 201 Tenn. 562, 300 S.W.2d 920 (1957). But see
I WHARTON § 361, p. 723, text accompanying note 16.
32. 467 S.W.2d 844 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
33. Id. at 847. "A deadly weapon is any weapon or instrument which, from the manner
in which it is used or attempted to be used, is likely to produce death or cause great bodily
injury." Id.
34. Crenshaw v. State, 43 Tenn. 350, 353 (1866).
35. See 1970 Survey at 190-91.
36. 460 S.W.2d 858 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
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house of prostitution investigating complaints of theft from patrons.
He purchased the services of two girls who took the money to the
defendant upstairs. When they returned, the officer identified himself
and advised them that they were under arrest. A commotion ensued,
whereupon the defendant confronted the officer with a loaded pistol.
According to the officer, the defendant cocked the pistol and ordered
the officer to give him the rest of his money. The defendant grabbed
his wallet when he took it from his pocket. According to the defendant, he was merely protecting his girls; he asked the officer for
identification, and the latter threw the wallet at the defendant. Before
the matter could proceed any further, other officers entered the building, and the defendant, holding the wallet, was arrested. The appellate court sustained the conviction holding that the jury had evidently
rejected the defendant's version of the facts, and the evidence did not
preponderate against that verdict.
2.

Burglary

In Wyatt v. State7 the court held that a hotel room occupied
by a paying guest was a "dwelling-house" for the purpose of proving
the elements of burglary."8 A short time thereafter, this decision was
ratified by the legislature through an amendment to the burglary and
second degree burglary statutes extending coverage to
any other house, buildirg, room or rooms therein used and
occupied by any person or persons as a dwelling place or lodging
either permanently or temporarily and whether as owner, renter,
tenant, lessee or paying guest."
Insofar as the issue raised in the Wyatt case is concerned, the statutory amendment is superfluous as that decision simply reflected the
rule at common law." However, there is some authority for the notion that where the occupant is a mere transient, the premises will be
considered the dwelling house of the landlord, whether or not the
landlord lives on the premises.4 This distinction only becomes of
37. 467 S.W.2d 811 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
38. TENN. CODE ANN. §29-901 (1955).
39. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-901, 903 (Supp. 1971).
40. See 2 WHARTON § 425.
41. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 206 (2d ed. 1969); CLARK
(7th ed. 1967).

AND MARSHALL, CRIMES

990-91

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

significance where the accused is himself the landlord, and he argues
that the dwelling-house is not "of another" as required at common
law. The statutory amendment removes this possibility by making the
dwelling-house that of the occupant, whether the occupancy is of a
permanent or temporary nature.
Burglary in the third degree consists of "the breaking and entering into a business house, out house, or any other house of another,
other than a dwelling house."' 2 In 1964, in Fox v. State,'3 the Supreme Court of Tennessee was called upon to determine the applicability of this statute to a defendant who entered a public telephone
booth and broke into the coin receptacle. Conceding that entering the
telephone booth was lawful and therefore could not amount to a
breaking, the court turned to another section of the code which provided that breaking after entry could satisfy the breaking element of
burglary." However, this provision was explicity applicable only to
dwelling houses, not to premises included in burglary in the third
6 the
degree. 5 Nevertheless, citing its prior decision in Page v. State,"
court held "the same reasoning" was applicable to burglary in the
third degree. The Page court cited authority for the notion that at
common law breaking can occur after entry. 7 However, the passage
cited was wholly in reference to the breaking of an inner door. Such
was the situation in the Page case.
The result in the Fox case flies in the face of at least three rules
of statutory construction. If the position of the court is that it is
simply applying a common law definition to "breaking" then the
statute concerning breaking after entry is superfluous, a result inconsistent with the presumption that the legislature will not pass a meaningless statute.' If the court is holding that the breaking after entry
statute is to be applied to the burglary in the third degree statute,
despite its express disclaimer, the holding is inconsistent with the
rules of interpretation that statutes in derogation of the common law
42.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-902 (1955).

43.
44.
45.

214 Tenn. 694, 383 S.W.2d 25 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 933 (1965).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-902 (1955).
Arguably, the section would also be applicable to burglary in the second degree.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-903 (Supp. 1971). The critical language is "the premises mentioned in
sec. 39-901." Id. § 39-902 (1955). These are the same premises mentioned in § 39-903, second
degree burglary simply eliminating the requirement that the offense occur at nighttime.
46. 170 Tenn. 586, 98 S.W.2d 98 (1936).
47. See 2 WHARTON § 416.
48.

SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 4510 (1943).
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are to be strictly construed," and criminal statutes are to be strictly
construed in favor of the accused."0
In light of the dubious underpinnings for the Fox decision, in
Heald v. State,"' where again a defendant was charged with breaking
into a coin box in a telephone booth, the defendant urged on appeal
that the court overrule Fox. The court of criminal appeals declined
to consider the possibility, as it felt bound by the prior decision of
the supreme court. The latter court denied certiorari."
D.

Public Offenses

In Baxter v. Ellington5" student leaders at the University of
Tennessee brought a class action for a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief from several statutes alleged to proscribe activities
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. Addressing itself
to the disorderly conduct statute,54 the court found the terms "offensive or boisterous conduct or language" and "indecent" overbroad
and declared the first clause of the statute unconstitutional. The
court next considered the constitutionality of a recently enacted statute making criminal the interference with normal activities of campus
buildings or facilities. 55 The offense was found to consist of three
elements: "(1) presence at a school facility; (2) acts interfering, or
tending to interfere with normal, orderly, peaceful or efficient conduct of the school facility; and (3) failure to leave the facility when
ordered to do so by an administrative official." 5 The court held the
final element to be constitutionally intolerable because of its chilling
impact on first amendment freedoms. 57 Several other statutes, also
49. Id. § 6201.
50. Id. §§ 5604, 5605.
51. 472 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
52. Id.
53. 318 F. Supp. 1079 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
54. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1213 (Supp. 1971).
55. Id. § 39-1215.
56. 318 F. Supp. at 1086.
57. "Little imagination is required to conceive of acts interfering or tending to interfere
with the normal, orderly, peaceful or efficient conduct of an educational facility which fall
within the protection of the First Amendment. An obvious danger is that the administrator's
hostility to the acts committed will influence his decisions. The entire statute is vague and
overbroad." Id.
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challenged in the petition, survived constitutional scrutiny. 5
In McCoy v. State59 the defendant was convicted of-allowing a
minor to loiter where alcoholic beverages were sold.60 The evidence
most favorable to the prosecution indicated that a nineteen-year-old
girl " had been observed seated in a booth drinking beer with two male
companions. The trial court charged the jury in the terms of the
statute.62 Following the charge, defense counsel requested that its
special charge defining loitering 3 be submitted to the jury. The request was denied, the trial judge indicating that as the statute provided no definition, it would be left to the jury. On appeal, the court
held that the trial court should have given the requested instruction
as the term loiter might "be susceptible to many definitions by a jury
of laymen.'' 64
The question of the quantum of proof necessary to establish
6 Pursuant to a
possession of marijuana'- arose in Dishman v. State.1
warrant, officers carried out a search of defendant Dishman's residence for marijuana and narcotic drugs. At the time of the search
Dishman and defendant Henry were seated in the living room but
were not smoking. On the coffee table between them "was an ashtray
with three smoked cigarettes or cigarette butts, two packages of ciga-

58. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1216 (Supp. 1971) (not constitutionally overbroad or vague);
Id. § 39-1217 and § 39-5116 (possible arbitrary classification of persons subject to differing
penalties, but as no first amendment issue involved, state courts should resolve issue); Id. § 392805 (prior adjudication [Armstrong v. Ellington, 312 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Tenn. 1970)]
resolved constitutionality.)
59. 466 S.W.2d 540 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
60. TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-221 (Supp. 1971).
61. Presumably, TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-313 (Supp. 1971), changing the age of "legal
responsibility" to eighteen, would prevent the facts in the present case from coming within the
loitering statute.
62. "It shall be unlawful for the management of any place where any beverage licensed
hereunder is sold to allow any minor to loiter about such place of business, and the burden of
ascertaining the age of minor customers shall be upon the owner or operator of such place of
business." TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-221 (Supp. 1971).
63, Definition of loiter as provided by Black's law dictionary-"To be dilatory, to be
slow in movement, to stand around, to spend time idly, to saunter, to delay, to idle, to linger,
to lag behind." 466 S.W.2d at 542.
64. Id. "The minor girl's presence on the premises is not of itself sufficient to sustain a
conviction." Id. at 543. See also Hooper v. State, 194 Tenn. 600, 253 S.W.2d 765 (1952).
65. TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-1303 (1965 Replacement). This section was repealed by
TENN. PUBLIC ACTS 1971, ch. 163, § 44, and replaced by TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-1432 (Supp.
1971).
66. 460 S.W.2d 855 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
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rette papers and some loose greenish material and seed.""7 Evidence
was also found at several other locations in the house." Henry denied
any complicity in the possession or use of marijuana, submitting that
Dishman had asked him to help repair a television antenna. The court
sustained the conviction of Dishman, finding ample evidence to support the conclusion that he was in possession of marijuana in his
home. However, the prosecution failed to disprove Henry's contention that he lacked any knowledge of the presence of marijuana, and
his conviction was reversed. 9
The Tennessee Drug Control Act of 197170 resulted in a substantial overhaul of the statutory regulation of narcotics, the most notable
aspect being the creation of six categories of controlled substances
with graduated criminal sanctions correlated to the danger posed by
each grouping. The mere possession of a controlled substance, without intent to manufacture, deliver or sell, was made a misdemeanor,
as was the possession of marijuana not in excess of one-half ounce
for distribution without remuneration. Other legislative enactments
made criminal the distribution of publications without the name of
the publisher or person responsible for the contents appearing thereon, 7 1 and the copying of audio recordings without the consent of the
72
owner.
III.
A.

DEFENSES

Self-Defense

A proper plea of self-defense is a complete defense to a charge
of homicide. In order to rely on the defense, the defendant must have
no reasonable alternative to the use of deadly force for selfprotection.73 In Spears v. State,7" the defendant traveled some seven
67. Id. at 856.
68. "Under the couch on which Henry was sitting and close to his feet, there was an open
plastic bag of marijuana. On a table across the room from Henry, there were three open plastic
bags with loose material similar in appearance. The officers also found in a bedroom a partly
smoked home-rolled cigarette." Id.
69. See also Thornton v. State, 481 P.2d 484 (Okla. 1971); Commonwealth v. Florida,
272 A.2d 476 (Pa. 1971). Cf People v. Davis, 29 Mich. App. 443, 185 N.W.2d 609 (1971).
70. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 952-1408-1448 (Supp. 1971).
71. Id. § 39-5201.
72. Id. §§39-4244-4250.
73. See 1968 Survey at 323-33.
74. 466 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
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miles from the scene of the affray, armed himself, returned and shot
the deceased. The court did not consider the claim of self-defense
credible.7" A legitimate claim of self-defense was found in Hughes v.
State" where the defendant was assaulted by another inmate in the
state penitentiary.77 In Lewelling v. State" the court held that the
record did not sustain the finding that the victim, who shot at the
defendant, had acted in self-defense, and therefore the defendant was
guilty of second degree murder. Rather, the court held the defendant
himself had a legitimate claim of self-defense which should have been
entertained by the trial court.
IV.

A.

PROCEDURE

Equal Protection

1. Working Off Fines
The constitutional propriety of converting a penal fine to a period of incarceration came before the United States Supreme Court
in Tate v. Short.79 The petitioner had accumulated fines totaling $425
for traffic offenses which he was unable to pay because of indigency.
The fine was thereupon converted at the rate of one day for each five
dollars, s° to a term at the prison farm. The previous year in Williams
v. Illinois,"1 the Court, considering a convicton for petty theft which
was punishable by both imprisonment and fine,8" had held that where
the period of confinement exceeded that permitted by statute for the
particular offense, the defendant had been denied equal protection 3
By implication the Court held that if the sentence, determined by
converting dollars to days, did not exceed the maximum term for the
offense, the device was constitutional. 84 The Tate court distinguished
Cf Gray v. State, 203 Tenn. 332, 313 S.W.2d 246 (1968).
465 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
Cf May v. State, 220 Tenn. 541, 420 S.W.2d 647 (1967).
460 S.W.2d 847 (Tenn. 1970).
401 U.S. 395 (1971).
This was authorized by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC., art. 45.53 (1966), and HOUSTON,
TEX., CODE § 35-8.
81. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
82. The defendant had been given a year in prison, a $500 fine and five dollars in court
costs.
83. See 1970 Survey at 202-03.
84. This may be read not as a sanctioning of the conversion formula but a recognition
that an equivalent directly applied sentence falls within legal limits.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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Williams since the state had adopted a "fines only" approach to
traffic offenses. In this instance, any period of incarceration would
violate the equal protection clause.85 The Court reiterated its observations in Williams that states could innovate alternative means of
enforcing payments of fines by those presently unable to pay, such
as the provision for the payment of the fine in installments. 6 It further observed that imprisonment was not precluded, even in the case
of "fines only" offenses, when the defendant had the means to pay a
fine but refused or neglected to do so. Finally, the Court left open
the question of the constitutionality of imprisonment where alternative means have been unsuccessful, notwithstanding the reasonable
effort of the defendant to comply.87
2.

Right to Transcript

In 1956, in Griffin v. Illinois,88 the United States Supreme Court
held that the equal protection clause required that an accused incapable of affording a transcript of his trial be provided one without cost
where such was needed for an effective appeal and where such transcripts were available to those who could afford them. In Mayer v.
City of Chicago," the appellant was convicted of disorderly conduct
and interference with a police officer and given a $250 fine on each
count.9 He sought to appeal the convictions on the grounds that the
evidence was insufficient and that misconduct on the part of the
prosecutor had denied him a fair trial. Illinois rules of procedure
provided for a transcript without cost only where the defendant was
convicted of a felony. 9 The Supreme Court held that the distinction
drawn between felony and non-felony offenses was not a legitimate
classification within the scope of the due process clause of the four-

85. "Imprisonment in such a case is not imposed to further any penal objective of the
State. It is imposed to augment the State's revenues but obviously does not serve that purpose;
the defendant can't pay because he is indigent and his imprisonment, rather than aid collection
of the revenue, saddles the State with the cost of feeding and housing him for the period of his
imprisonment." 401 U.S. at 399.
86. Id. at 400 n.6. See also State v. Walding, 10 CRIM. L. REP. 2196 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
November 12, 1971).
87. "IT]he determination of the constitutionality of imprisonment in that circumstance
must await the presentation of a concrete case." 401 U.S. at 401.
88. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
89. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
90. The statutory maximum for each offense was $500.
91. III. Sup. Ct. Rule 607(b).
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teenth amendment." Nor did the fact that the appellant was subject
only to a fine affect the case. 3 At the same time the Court made it
clear that it was not recognizing an automatic right to a transcript
in all criminal appeals. It quoted Draper v. Washington4 for the
notion that an alternative to a transcript might provide a "record of
sufficient completeness" in some cases and in others portions of the
transcript would be enough." The extent of the right would turn upon
the nature of the errors alleged by the appellant. The errors alleged
in the present case were of such nature that the right to a complete
transcript was presumptively established, pending the possible showing of a suitable alternative, an issue not explored by the courts
below.
In a companion case, Brill v. North Carolina," the petitioner
requested a transcript of his first trial, which ended in a mistrial, in
order to prepare for his second trial. Again, a party able to afford
such a transcript could obtain one. The Court identified two factors
relevant in determining the need for a transcript:

92. "The size of the defendant's pocketbook bears no more relationship to his guilt or
innocence in a nonfelony than in a felony case." 404 U.S. at 196. See also Groppi v. Wisconsin,
400 U.S. 505 (1971) (discussed in text accompanying note 247 infra).
93. "Griffin does not represent a balance between the needs of the accused and the
interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of
as effective an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own way. The invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are made available only to those
who can pay is not erased by any differences in the sentences that may be imposed." 404 U.S.
at 196-97.
94. 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
95. "Alternative methods of reporting trial proceedings are permissible if they place
before the appellate court an equivalent report of the events at trial from which the appellant's
contentions arise. A statement of facts agreed to by both sides, a full narrative statement based
perhaps on the trial judge's minutes taken during trial or on the court reporter's untranscribed
notes, or a bystander's bill of exceptions might be all adequate substitutes, equally good as a
transcript. Moreover, part or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be
germane to consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds
unnecessarily in such circumstances. If, for instance, the points urged relate only to the validity
of the statute or the sufficiency of the indictment upon which conviction was predicated, the
transcript is irrelevant and need not be provided. If the assignments of error go only to rulings
on evidence or to its sufficiency, the transcript provided might well be limited to the portions
relevant to such issues. Even as to this kind of issue, however, it is unnecessary to afford a
record of the proceedings pertaining to an alleged failure of proof on a point which is irrelevant
as a matter of law to the elements of the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. In
the examples given, the fact that an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by
unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcript does not mean that the State must
waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate appellate review." Id. at 495-96.
96. 404 U.S. 226 (1971).

19721

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

(I) the value of the transcript to the defendant in connection with
the appeal or trial for which it is sought, and (2) the availability of
alternative devices that would fulfill the same functions as a tran97
script.
The Court was virtually ready to assume that the transcript would
have been materially beneficial to the petitioner.9 However, the denial of a transcript was sustained because of an alternative means of
fulfilling the need-the availability of the court reporter to read back
to counsel any portions of the transcript in which he had an interest."
This, coupled with the fact that the two trials were but a month apart
and the memories of petitioner and counsel could accomplish a sizeable reconstruction of the trial, adequately protected the rights of the
petitioner.
B.

Arrest

1. Occurrence of
If a suspect voluntarily accompanies an officer to the stationhouse, an arrest has not occurred and therefore a showing of probable
cause is not required. 00 A careful scrutiny of the facts may be required where the accused contends he did not believe he was free to
go, notwithstanding statements of the officer to the contrary.'0' A
stationhouse detention of an individual against his will, without probable cause, violates the fourth amendment and thus any fruits of the
detention are inadmissible. Contrasting results are to be found in
97. Id. at 227.
98. "Our cases have consistently recognized the value to a defendant of a transcript of
prior proceedings, without requiring a showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular
case." Id.at 228.
99. "The trial of the case took place in a small town where, according to petitioner's
counsel, the court reporter was a good friend of all the local lawyers and was reporting the
second trial. It appears that the reporter would at any time have read back to counsel his notes
of the mistrial, well in advance of the second trial, if counsel had simply made an informal
request." Id. at 229.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 425 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1970) (discussed in 1970
Survey at 205-06); Law v. Cox, 329 F. Supp. 849 (D. Va. 1971); Shephard v. United States,
274 A.2d 413 (D.C. App. 1971); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 276 N.E.2d 283 (Mass. 1971).
101. See State v. Mambaugh, 481 P.2d 443 (Ariz. 1971); Robinson v. United States, 278
A.2d 458 (D.C. App. 1971); State v. Murphy, 249 So. 2d 560 (La. 1971). See generally Cook,
Subjective Attitudes of Arrestee and Arrestor as Affecting Occurrence of Arrest, 19 KAN. L.
REV. 173 (1971).
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Davis v. Mississippi 2 where fingerprints obtained during such a detention were ruled inadmissible, 03 and in Morales v. New York' 4
where the Court remanded a case in which a confession obtained
during a stationhouse detention was at issue, suggesting that the
lower court might find that the suspect had voluntarily accompanied
the officers to the station. In United States v. Holland'0 5 the accused,
while at F.B.I. headquarters, was photographed, and the photograph
was subsequently used for purposes of identification. The court held
that the Davis rationale was inapplicable because the accused had
voluntarily accompanied the agents to the headquarters.
2.

Probable Cause

Unique probable cause to arrest issues arose in two cases before
the United States Supreme Court during the past year. In Hill v.
California'"' officers with probable cause went to the petitioner's
apartment to arrest him on a charge of robbery. A person answered
the door who fit the description of Hill, and they arrested him. The
person arrested denied that he was Hill and produced identification
bearing a different name. The officers were not convinced and proceeded to search the entire apartment.'0 It was later determined that
the party arrested was in fact not Hill. The prosecution, however, still
had an interest in sustaining the legality of the arrest, because the
search, only justifiable as being incident thereto, produced evidence
used against the real Hill at his trial. The Court upheld the arrest,
because (1) the officers had probable cause to arrest Hill, and (2) they
reasonably and in good faith believed the person they arrested was
Hill. The case then fell within the well-honored maxim that the legality of an arrest is to be determined on the basis of the information
known to the police at the time of the arrest. Usually this rule is cited
in the converse situation-where the officer lacks probable cause at
the time of the arrest but turns out to be right. Such an after-the-fact

102. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
103. See Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1969-A Critical Survey, 37 TENN. L.
REV. 433, 471-72 (1970) (hereinafter cited 1969 Survey).
104. 396 U.S. 102 (1969).
105. 438 F.2d 887 (6th Cir. 1971).
106. 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
107. The search was found reasonable under pre-Chimel standards. See text accompanying note 123 infra.
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rationalization cannot meet fourth amendment standards. 08 The reasoning is equally applicable in the present instance; the fact that the
officers turn out to be wrong is immaterial to the question of probable
cause at the time of the arrest. 9
In Whiteley v. Warden"0 an arrest was made by a patrolman in
reliance upon a radio bulletin directing the arrest of the petitioner for
breaking and entering. It was subsequently determined that the warrant for arrest, upon which the radio bulletin was made, was invalid.
Nevertheless, the prosecution sought to sustain the arrest on the
theory that the arresting officer could reasonably rely upon the radio
bulletin in making the arrest. The Court was quick to acknowledge
the propriety of officers relying upon information received from other
officers. And, indeed, when the totality of information possessed by
the police reaches the level of probable cause, the fact that the arresting officer himself does not personally know sufficient facts to support the arrest will not invalidate it."' But where the combined information does not reach the level of probable cause-and here the
corroborating data known to the police was insufficient-then the
radio bulletin could not create a basis for the arrest where none
existed.
The most straight-forward manifestation of probable cause to
arrest is found where a crime is committed in the presence of the
arresting officer. In Lederer v. Tehan"2 an officer observed the appellant in a rented truck breaking up a statuary of a llama"' and
extracting small packets therefrom. Various weapons and tools were
scattered around the floor of the truck. The court held that had the
officer not concluded he had probable cause to arrest for a narcotics
offense, he "would have been notably lacking in commonsense."" 4 In
Radcliffe v. Cartwell" an officer responded to the activation of a
108. See, e.g.. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 401 (1968); Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98 (1959); United Stats v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
109. For other cases involving mistake as to the identity of the arrestee, see Cook,
Probable Cause to Arrest, 24 VAND. L. REV. 317, 319-21 (1971).
110. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). See also Hebron v. State,
13 Md. App. 134, 281 A.2d 547 (1971); Muggley v. State, 478 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Crim. App.
1971).
112. 441 F.2d 295 (6th Cir. 1971).
113. According to the court, counsel had dubbed the proceedings "The Case of the
Hashish Llama."
114. 441 F.2d at 297.
115. 446 F.2d 1141 (1971).
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burglar alarm at a residence. He observed an automobile emerge
from the street on which the residence was located, with the squealing
of tires and a fish-tail motion. He stopped the vehicle and placed its
occupants under arrest. The court held that the officer reasonably
concluded that the occupants of the automobile had been involved in
the burglary, and the arrest was legal.
C.

Search and Seizure

1. Attacking the Affidavit
A question still unresolved by the United States Supreme Court
is whether an accused should be permitted the opportunity to attack
the veracity of allegations contained in an affidavit for a search warrant." ' Some courts have been unwilling to go behind the affidavit
and warrant where the facts alleged constituted probable cause." 7
Others have taken the position that if the allegations are untrue, then
probable cause was not present to justify the issuance of the warrant." 8 This would seem particularly persuasive where the false allegations have been deliberate."' Tennessee courts have refused to permit an attack on an affidavit for a search warrant, 2 0 with the caveat
that a different result would be reached should the defendant be able
116. See Rugendorf v. United Stats, 376 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1964): "Petitioners attack
the validity of the search warrant. This court has never passed directly on the extent to which
a court may permit such an examination when the search warrant is valid on its face and when
the allegations of the underlying affidavit establish 'probable cause'."
For arguments supporting such attack, see Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for Suppressing Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REV. 825 (1971); Mascolo,
Impeaching the Credibility of Affidavits for Search Warrants: Piercing the Presumption of
Validity, 44 CONN. B.J. 9 (1970).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Bowling, 351 F.2d 236, 242 n.2 (6th Cir. 1965); People
v. Stansberry, 47 I1. 2d 541, 268 N.E.2d 431 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971); State
v. Anselmo, 256 So.2d 98 (La. 1971); Mason v. State, 280 A.2d 753 (Md. App. 1971).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Roth, 391 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1967).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Dunnings, 425 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1002 (1970); People v. McDonald, 480 P.2d 555 (Colo. 1971); State v. Carluccio, 116 N.J.
Super. 49, 280 A.2d 853 (1971); Commonwealth v. D'Angelo, 437 Pa. 331, 263 A.2d 441 (1970).
120. Owens v. State, 217 Tenn. 544, 399 S.W.2d 507 (1965); O'Brien v. State, 205 Tenn.
405, 326 S.W.2d 759 (1959); Solomon v. State, 203 Tenn. 583, 315 S.W.2d 99 (1958); Gallimore
v. State, 173 Tenn. 178, 116 S.W.2d 1001 (1938); Reed v. State, 162 Tenn. 643, 39 S.W.2d
749 (1931).
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to show "fraud or collusion."
22
Poole v. State.
2.

'

This standard was reaffirmed in

Incident to Arrest

The limitations placed upon searches incident to arrest by
Chimel v. California'2 continue to be a prime source of litigation.
In Williams v. United States2 4 the Supreme Court determined that
the Chimel decision would not be applied retroactively. 2 5 While
Chimel ostensibly left little room for exceptions to the strictures of
its holding, lower courts have persistently created exceptions, particularly where common sense supported the reasonableness of a given
search. In Goodner v. State,' the defendant was arrested on a charge
of armed robbery in the living room of a residence where he had been
sleeping on a couch in his underwear. Before ordering him to dress,
the officers searched his clothing and found a loaded gun and money
in the pockets of the coat he was to put on. The court found the search
reasonable, noting that a contra result would have permitted the
arrestee to arm himself.'2
3.

Exigent Circumstances

The presumptive requirement of a warrant as a condition precedent to a valid search may be foregone when the exigent circumstances
render the securing of a warrant impractical. A common instance,
exemplified by Warden v. Hayden, 28 involves the arrest and incidental search executed by police in "hot pursuit.'1 2 In United States v.

121. Solomon v. State, 203 Tenn. 583, 315 S.W.2d 99 (1958); Reed v. State, 162 Tenn.
643, 39 S.W.2d 749 (1931).
While these words are not used in Owens v. State, 217 Tenn. 544, 399 S.W.2d 507 (1965),
the court talked in terms of an affidavit containing "facts upon which the affiant bases his
reasonable belief," id. at 553, 399 S.W.2d at 511, which produces the equivalent understanding.
122. 467 S.W.2d 826 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971) (the court quoted from Owens, supra).
123. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See 1969 Survey at 476.
124. 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
125. See also Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
126. 464 S.W.2d 339 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
127. See also United States v. Titus, 445 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1971); Giacalone v. Lucas,
445 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Falconer v. Pate, 319 F. Supp. 206 (N.D.
Ill. 1970); People v. Giacalone, 23 Mich. App. 163, 178 N.W.2d 162 (1970); People v. Mann,
61 Misc. 2d 107, 505 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
128. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
129. See 1969 Survey at 477-78.
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Rose 30 officers located an automobile used in a bank robbery less
than two hours after the crime. Footprints in the snow led from the
automobile to an apartment house a short distance away. There, wet
footprints continued up the stairs. A downstairs occupant informed
the officers that the vehicle had been parked shortly prior to their
arrival and its two occupants had gone upstairs. The officers knocked
at each of the upstairs apartments 3' and received no response. They
then proceeded to an unmarked door, slightly ajar, knocked and
announced their presence and purpose. When there was no response,
one of the officers pushed the door further open and observed one of
the defendants holding a rifle, and a large amount of money on a bed.
He, and the other defendant, also found in the apartment, were arrested and weapons and the money were seized. The court found the
arrests and seizures reasonable, citing the Hayden decision.,
4.

Vehicle Searches

Warrantless searches of vehicles continue to be frequently sustained on the authority of Chambers v. Maroney'3 where the officer
has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains seizable evidence. 134 Similarly, Cooper v. California3 5 provides authority for
the warrantless search of a vehicle where it is legally held by the
3
police as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding.1
5.

Misplaced Confidence

The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that no
constitutional rights are violated when officers employ a special agent
or informant to gain the confidence of a suspect and engage in a
conversation which is subsequently recounted by the participant or is
130. 440 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 838 (1971).
131. The downstairs occupant advised them that only one of the apartments should be
occupied.
132. See also Chappell v. United States, 342 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
133. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). See 1970 Survey at 214-16.
134. Figer v. Perini, 440 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Strickland, 329 F.
Supp. 1345 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); Cook v. State, 466 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971);
Yocum v. State, 469 S.W.2d'538 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970); Graybeal v. State, 463 S.W.2d 159
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
135. 386 U.S. 68 (1966).
136. United States v. Mills, 440 F.2d 647 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 837
(1971).

19721

CRIMINAL LA W SURVEY

heard or recorded by another officer. 7 In United States v. White3 8
the Court was called upon to determine whether the misplaced confidence decisions had been implicitly overruled or modified by Katz
v. United States3 9 which reconceptualized the fourth amendment
protection in terms of a right of privacy. In White, eight separate
conversations between the respondent and a government informant
were transmitted through radio equipment concealed on the person
of the informant to officers located nearby. 40 The government was
unable to produce the agent who had participated in the conversations, but they were permitted to introduce the testimony of the
officers who conducted the electronic surveillance. The lower court
had concluded that Katz had overruled On Lee v. United States,4'
in which a comparable surveillance tactic had been upheld. The Supreme Court4 2 found the cases distinguishable. The problem, in terms
of the Katz standard, was not whether a particular suspect may have
relied on the discretion of his companions. The question was rather
what expectation of privacy was constitutionally "justifiable." If
nothing in the constitution protects an individual from the decision
of a confidant to testify respecting statements made by the accused,
[for constitutional purposes, no different result is required if the
agent instead of immediately reporting and transcribing his conversations with the defendant, either (1) simultaneously records them
with electronic equipment which he is carrying on his person... ;
(2) or carries equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations either to recording equipment located elsewhere or to other
agents monitoring the transmitting frequency.'
Nor, submitted the Court, should the unavailability at trial of the
137. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206
(1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952).
138. 401 U.S. 745 (1971), rehearingdenied, 402 U.S. 990 (1971).
139. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
140. In four instances, the conversations were also overheard by an agent concealed in a
closet within earshot.
141. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
142. Only four Justices concurred in the opinion of the Court. Justice Black concurred
separately, relying on his dissent in Katz which denied the application of the fourth amendment
to conversations. Justice Brennan concurred separately for the reason, also noted in the plurality opinion, that Katz should not be given retrospective application. Justices Douglas, Harlan
and Marshall dissented.
143. 401 U.S. at 745. See also United States v. Hoffa, 437 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1971).

268
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agent who participated in the conversation have any bearing on the
scope of the protection of the fourth amendment."
D.

PreliminaryHearing

A significant addition to the rights of persons accused of crime
was accomplished legislatively by the provisions,
[i]n all criminal cases, prior to presentment and indictment, whether
the charge be a misdemeanor or a felony, the accused shall be
entitled to a preliminary hearing upon his request therefore, [sic]
whether the grand jury be in session or not. 4
The statute may be read to mean the initiative for such a hearing
must be taken by the defendant, and thus he could conceivably be
denied the right through ignorance. While there is no constitutional
right to a preliminary hearing, to cause the utilization of the statutory
right to be limited to those aware of it would likely be viewed as a
denial of equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment.' In any event, it is clear that where a preliminary hearing is
held, the accused is entitled to the sixth amendment right to coun47
sel.
E. Speedy Trial
When an accused claims that his right to a speedy trial under
the sixth amendment has been violated, a court may find it appropriate to review the reasons for the delay. The right to a speedy trial is
relative and depends upon the circumstances. 4 The mere passage of
time is not enough. 49 A delay explained as unavoidable for the pur-

144. "His unavailability at trial and proffering the testimony of other agents may raise
evidentiary problems or pose issues of prosecutorial misconduct with respect to the informer's
disappearance, but they do not appear critical to deciding whether prior events invaded the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights." 401 U.S. at 754.
145. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1131 (Supp. 1971).
146. Cf., e.g.. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956): "It is true that a State is not
required by the federal constitution to provide appellate courts or a right of appellate review
at all. . . . But that is not to say that a State that does grant appellate review can do so in a
way that discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty."
147. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
148. See United States v. Beard, 381 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1967); Welsh v. United States,
348 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1965); Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1959); State v.
Gossage, 470 S.W.2d 39 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
149. Short v. Cardwell, 444 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir. 1971).
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pose of preparing the case for the prosecution may be viewed as
reasonable.5 0 Thus in Barker v. Wingo'5 the trial of the defendant
was delayed until the completion of the trial of an accomplice. The
testimony of the accomplice was considered essential to the prosecution of the defendant, and it was known that he would effectively
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination if called as a witness
prior to the completion of his own trial. The delay for this purpose
extended over four years and three months. The court appeared to
find the purpose of the delay reasonable, but rested its decision on
the absence of two factors considered essential for a successful claim:
(1) a demand for trial on the part of the defendant,1 2 and (2) a
showing of prejudice resulting from the delay.' In United States v.
Heard5 ' the court was sympathetic with the fact that the prosecutor's
office had been short-staffed and had therefore tried defendants who
were presently in jail before trying defendants who were on bail.
Again, the court emphasized the absence of demand and a showing
of prejudice. Even where the defendant is presently serving another
sentence, he will be expected to make a demand for a speedy trial
before a complaint will be heard.' 55
F.

Guilty Plea

Entering a guilty plea is the functional equivalent of a verdict of
guilty by judge or jury, and nothing remains to be done but the
Because of the finality of the
entering of judgment and sentence.'
decision to plead guilty it may not be done by counsel against the
wishes of the defendant.' 57 When effectively entered, it stands as a
waiver of all prior non-jurisdictional defects. 5 Complaint will be
150. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 347 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1965); State v. Anonymous, 278 A.2d 151 (Conn. 1971); People v. Collins, 66 Misc. 2d 340, 320 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1970).
151. 442 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir. 1971).
152. See also Short v. Cardwell, 444 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir. 1971); Pruitt v. State, 460
S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970); State ex rel. Lewis v. State, 447 S.W.2d 42 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1969).
153. See also State v. Gossage, 470 S.W.2d 30 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); State v. McCullough, 470 S.W.2d 50 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Edmaiston v. State, 452 S.W.2d 677 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1970).
154. 443 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1971).
155. Short v. Cardwell, 444 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir. 1971).
156. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220
(1927).
157. Palfy v. Cardwell, 448 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1971).
158. Austin v. Perini, 434 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1970).
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heard only where the accused can show that the guilty plea itself is
the fruit of the prior illegal conduct of officials.' 59 Such an argument
was made in Cunningham v. Wingo 60 where it was contended that
mistreatment while in jail had coerced a guilty plea. The appellant
was suspected in connection with a jailbreak and as a result was
subjected to the most austere living conditions for some sixty days.'"'
The court was quick to concede that the treatment accorded the
defendant amounted to cruel and unusual punishment."' Nevertheless, it could not be said that the abuse had prompted the plea,
because the appellant had expressed a desire to plead guilty three
weeks prior to the punitive treatment. At that time the appellant had
sought a ten year sentence, and the court found if he had received
such, the validity of the plea would never have been challenged. The
appellant actually received a twenty-one year sentence, and the issue
therefore became, according to the court, whether he had been promised anything less. The court concluded that he had not, and therefore
the plea was valid. The reasoning of the court is subject to criticism
for the failure to properly distinguish two distinct bases for attacking
a guilty plea: that the accused voluntarily entered the plea and that
he entered the plea understanding the consequences. When the appellant first explored the possibility of entering a plea of guilty, it may
be assumed that his decision was wholly voluntary. Presumably, he
did not and would not enter a plea at that time because the prosecution would not accept his terms. At the time he entered the plea, he
may have understood that he would receive a greater sentence than
he sought, but it does not necessarily follow that the plea was voluntary; perhaps the appellant gave up on bargaining for a plea because
of the unbearable conditions of his existence. His previous willingness
to negotiate a plea should not preclude a factual determination of the
159. See Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
160. 443 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1971).
161. "At the time of the attempted jail break, appellant was deprived of all food for a
period of four days; and from there on was given only one meal every three days for a period
of two weeks. He was then transferred to the 'black cat', a punishment cell, and received one
meal a day thereafter during his detention in the jail until his plea of guilty. In the 'black cat',
there was no mattress on the steel cot, and only one window for ventilation which was not
permitted to be opened by anyone except an officer. That window was kept closed. On the
ceiling of the cell were four large light bulbs, which were burning day and night. With the
window closed, the heat from the light bulbs would as appellant expressed it, 'kill you.' " Id.
at 198-99.
162. Id. at 204 n.3.
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possible coercion brought to bear prior to the entering of the plea.
The problem of the unfulfilled promise came before the Supreme
Court in Santobello v. New York. 6 3 There, following negotiations,
the prosecutor agreed to permit the petitioner to plead guilty to a
lesser included offense and to make no recommendation as to the
sentence. When the case eventually reached the sentencing stage, the
prosecutor with whom the petitioner had negotiated had been replaced. The new prosecutor recommended the maximum sentence of
one year. Over the objection of the petitioner, the sentencing judge
imposed the maximum sentence, although assuring the counsel that
the recommendation of the prosecutor had no influence on his decision. The Court held that whether the recommendation had actually
influenced the sentence was immaterial. The plain fact was that the
petitioner had been promised that no recommendation would be
made, and that promise had not been kept.
[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement by the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
inducement or consideration such promise must be fulfilled.' 64
Nor did the fact that the breach of the agreement was inadvertent
require a different result.'05
G.

Right of Confrontation

1. Cross-Examination of Witnesses
Fundamental to the sixth amendment right of confrontation is
the opportunity of the accused to cross-examine the witnesses against
him. In United States v. Beasley' the appellant complained of the
failure of the prosecution to call as a witness the laboratory technician who processed his latent palm print from the scene of the crime.
The court held that the technician, who merely "brought out" the
latent prints on a piece of paper, was not a witness "against" the
appellant. At the same time, the expert who had matched the print
with that of the appellant was a witness against him, and he had been

163.
164.
165.
166.

404 U.S. 257 (1971).
Id. at 262.
Id.
438 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1971).
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cross-examined by the appellant." 7 In Canady v. State'"" a tape recording made from broadcasts from squad cars during an attempted
apprehension which resulted in the deaths of two officers was introduced at their murder trial. The court found the tape had been properly authenticated and as a part of the res gestae constituted an
exception to the right of confrontation.
2.

Confession of Co-Conspirator

As a result of Bruton v. United States,' decided in 1968, a
substantial amount of litigation has involved the introduction into
evidence of a statement of a co-conspirator inculpating the defendant. 7 In Bruton the confession of a co-defendant was introduced in
evidence, but the confessor elected not to testify in his own defense.
The Court held that the implicated defendant had been denied the
right of confrontation. In an earlier case, Douglas v. Alabama,' a
witness, not a defendant in the present action, was called to testify,
and the prosecutor systematically read his confession into the record,
which implicated the defendant, stopping after every few sentences to
ask if the witness had not so confessed. Each time the witness asserted
his privilege agaist self-incrimination and did the same when crossexamination was attempted. The Court found a denial of the right
of confrontation.
Generally, if the confessor takes the stand and is subject to crossexamination, the right of the defendant has been satisfied. 7 In
Nelson v. O'Neil'7 3 the co-defendant took the stand but denied that
he had made the out-of-court statement which incriminated the defendant and claimed that its substance was false. The Court found
nothing improper in the procedure, holding
where a co-defendant takes the stand in his own defense, denies
making an alleged out-of-court statement implicating the defen167. See also Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958); Commonwealth v.
Harvard, 253 N.E.2d 346 (Mass. 1969); Robinson v. Commonwealth 211 Va. 62, 175 S.E.2d
260 (1970). But see Gilleylen v. State, 255 So. 2d 661 (Miss. 1971).
168. 461 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
169. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
170. See 1969 Survey at 464-66; 1970 Survey at 222.
171. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
172. United States v. Cale, 418 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1969); Woodall v. Neil, 328 F. Supp.
571 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); Walden v. Neil, 318 F. Supp. 968 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
173. 402 U.S. 622 (1971).
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dant, and proceeds to testify favorably to the defendant concerning
the underlying facts, the defendant has been denied
no rights pro74
tected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In Holbrook v. United States171 the appellant complained of the
use of statements of a co-indictee, not a co-defendant, which were
presented by another witness under an exception to the hearsay rule.
In absence of any claim by the appellant that he had attempted to
call the co-indictee as a witness, the court was not persuaded to hear
a claimed Bruton violation. If the defendant has in some way ratified
the accusatory statement of another, 76 any Bruton error will proba77
bly be viewed as harmless.
H.

Right to Counsel

1. Effective Assistance
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, courts
normally require that the trial be reduced to a farce or a mockery of
justice. 78 Tennessee courts have consistently held that the issue of
effective assistance cannot be raised where counsel is retained because
the assistance does not constitute state action. 79 Ineffective assistance
may be found where the attorney has had insufficient time to prepare
a defense.8 0 Tactical errors are an insufficient basis for establishing
ineffective assistance.' 8' Where a single counsel represents more than
one defendant, and the defenses of the various defendants are inconsistent, the assistance of counsel may be inadequate.8 2 It does not
follow, however, that joint representation is per se prejudicial. 83 In

174. Id. at 629-30.
175. 441 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1971).
176. Miller v. Cardwell, 448 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1971).
177. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
178. Palfy v. Cardwell, 448 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1970); Nelson v. State 470 S.W.2d 32
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Daugherty v. State, 470 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
179. Woodall v. Neil, 328 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); Leeper v. State, 472 S.W.2d
240 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Washington v. Tollett, 470 S.W.2d 841 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971);
Brewer v. State, 470 S.W.2d 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970); Beaty v. Neil, 467 S.W.2d 844 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1971). See also 1968 Survey at 251.
180. United States v. Knight, 443 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1971).
181. Daugherty v. State, 470 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Blankenship v. State,
469 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
182. Moran v. State, 472 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
183. United States v. Jones, 436 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1971). See also 1969 Survey at 484.

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 39

Daugherty v. State' 4 the defendant was tried jointly with his minor
son for burglary, the two being represented by the same attorney. The
strategy employed by the defense was to place the full responsibility
for the offense on the defendant and completely exonerate the son, a
strategy which proved to be successful: the son was found not guilty
and the defendant received the minimum sentence. The court found
the assistance of counsel to be commendable and the defendant without grounds to object. It would not appear that the defendant had
argued conflict of interest on the appeal. Presumably, a different
result might be reached if the familial relationship between the two
parties had not existed." 5 In Manuel v. Salisbury,8 ' the court found
that a conflict of interest was not demonstrated by the fact that the
defendant had discussed his case with an attorney whose partner later
assisted in the prosecution.
2.

Assistance other than Counsel

An increasing number of cases raise the issue of the need for
varities of assistance other than counsel, either as an adjunct to the
sixth amendment right or as a requirement of fourteenth amendment
due process. 7 In United States v. Stife 8s the prosecution sought the
use of neutron activation analysis evidence in its case. The court
determined that the evidence was admissible, but because of the potential for abuse in the use of such scientific evidence, it would be
necessary to permit the defendant to make similar tests, and at government expense if the defendant was an indigent. In United States
v. Jones8 9 counsel for an indigent requested additional assistance in
the form of an investigator to research newspapers to determine the
possible presence of adverse pre-trial publicity, and a fingerprint
comparison analysis for the purpoe of evaluating the opinion of a
prosecution witness who identified a thumb-print found at the scene
of the crime as that of the defendant. As to the first request, the work

184. 470 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
185. See also United States v. Cale, 418 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1969), discussed in 1970
Survey at 226.
186. 446 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1971).
187. See, e.g., Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United Staes v. Johnson,
238 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v. Germany, 32 F.R.D. 343 (M.D. Ala. 1963);
Comment, 16 VILL. L. REv. 323 (1970).
188. 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970).
189. 320 F. Supp. 901 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
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required involved no expertise was and therefore could be shouldered
by counsel himself. Less persuasive was the response of the court to
the second request: counsel had made "a searching and advised crossexamination" of the prosecutor's expert witness and had been unable
to shake his opinion. Thus, the court concluded, nothing could be
gained by allowing counsel to go "shopping" for another analyst who
might provide a contrary opinion.
3.

Identification Procedures

As a result of the recognition of a right to counsel at line-ups9
and the presence of a potential due process issue in all identification
procedures,' the method by which a witness identifies an accused has
become a prime source of litigation. 92 While a line-up identification
made without the presence of counsel representing the accused is
inadmissible at his trial,' the witness is not thereby precluded from
identifying the defendant at his trial if the prosecution can satisfy the
burden of proving the courtroom identification had a source independent of the improper line-up. 94
While indicating that a participant in a line-up should be allowed
to summon his own attorney, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that substitute counsel might "suffice when presence of the
suspect's own counsel would result in prejudicial delay."' 9 The Court
has not since had occasion to elaborate upon this possibility, but the
question has arisen in a number of lower court decisions. 9 ' In Brown
v. State'97 the defendant was advised of his rights preceding a line-up
and said he wanted an attorney. He knew no local counsel, where190. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967).
191. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967).
192. See 1969 Survey at 485-87; 1970 Survey at 224-25.
193. Whether Wade should apply to pre-indictment lineups is an open question. Compare
Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969), with United States v. Roth, 430 F.2d
1137 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1970).
194. Johnson v. Salisbury, 448 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1971); Brown v. State, 470 S.W.2d 39
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
195. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Queen, 435 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v.
Valez, 431 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Kirby, 427 F.2d 610 D.C. Cir. 1970);
United States v. Sanders, 322 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Pa. 1971); State v. Sigh, 470 S.W.2d 503
(Mo. 1971).
197. 470 S.W.2d 39 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
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upon the officers called upon a prominent local attorney to represent
him. The attorney consulted with him for some thirty minutes and
was present during the line-up. Ultimately, the defendant was represented by a different attorney, but counsel from the line-up was called
as a witness by the defense and testified at the trial. The court held
that the representation afforded the defendant at his line-up satisfied
the Wade standard. Indeed, it might well be said that the defendant
was more fortunate than most. Counsel at a line-up serves both as
an advisor and a witness. At trial, it is normally impossible for counsel to take the stand as a witness for the defense and still retain his
role as advocate. Defendant in this case was not confronted with this
dilemma, and at the same time, his counsel at the line-up was no mere
witness. He did in fact counsel the defendant and was, at least for the
time being, his representative and advocate.
Where the witness is confronted with a single suspect for identification the possibility of suggestiveness is much stronger. 19 8 Nevertheless subsequent courtroom identifications have frequently been sustained.' In United States v. DeBose 00 the court concluded that the
fact that the witness was an experienced police officer offset any
possibility that he would be susceptible to suggestiveness.
The particular suggestibility of a line-up is occasionally appraised by the courts.2 0' The lack of confidence of the witness in
making the identification goes to the credibility of the evidence, not
its admissibility.2 2 A number of decisions have sustained identifications taking place at judicial hearings prior to the trial of the defendant,20 3 but in United States v. Luck204 the court found such a
procedure impermissibly suggestive.20 5 Courts are generally unclear
as to the role to be played by counsel. 06 In United States v.
198. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rivera v. McKendrick, 448 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1971);
Browning v. Salisbury, 325 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
199. United States ex rel. Penachio v. Kropp, 448 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1971).
200. 433 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 920 (1971).
201. United States v. DeBose, 433 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1970) (error harmless); Brown v.
State, 470 S.W.2d 39 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
202. United States v. Toney, 440 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1971).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Hardy, 448 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Pollack, 427 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
204. 447 F.2d 1333 (6th Cir. 1971).
205. See also Mason v. United States, 414 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
206. See, e.g., Doss v. United States, 431 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Cunningham, 423 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1970); Sprigs v. Wilson, 419 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
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Gholston20 7 the court defined counsel's principal function to be "to
witness the line-up so that the entire proceeding may be reconstructed
by him during cross-examination at trial, in order to diminish the
weight given by the jury to eye-witness testimony.."200 The defendant
may, of course, waive counsel at the line-up. 20 9 If the defendant testifies at his trial and concedes the issue of identity, he thereby waives
any objection to impropriety in the identification procedure.21
Simmons v. United States21 1 sanctioned the use of photographs
for identification purposes and held a subsequent courtroom identification proper absent a procedure "so impermissibly suggestive as to
give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.1 2 12 Photographic identifications are frequently sustained
213
employing this standard.
I.

Self-Incrimination

1. Comment on-Failure to Testify
The privilege against self-incrimination permits the accused to
elect not to testify at his trial and precludes the prosecution and the
court from commenting adversely upon such a decision.21 4 Indirect
21
comment is equally prohibited.2 5 But in Hollbrook v. United States 1
the statement by the prosecutor, "I think you are entitled to hear
from the defendants," was held, when taken in context, to be a reference to counsel rather than the defendants themselves.2 17 In Scott v.
United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1969); People v. Williams, 92 Cal. Rptr. 6,
478 P.2d 942 (1971). See also Quinn, In the Wake of Wade: The Dimensions of the Eye- Witness
Identification Cases, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 135 (1970).
207. 437 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1971).
208. Id. at 263.
209. Garner v.State, 469 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
210. Jordan v. State, 467 S.W.2d 840 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
211. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
212. Id. at 384.
213. United States v. Serio, 440 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. DeBose, 433
F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1970). Cf United States v. Fried, 436 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 934 (1971).
214. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
215. See Huckaby v. State, 457 S.W.2d 872 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970), discussed in 1970
Survey at 227.
216. 441 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1971).
217. "Now Mr. Darvanan, counsel for the defendants, will have occasion to speak to you
and to argue to you on the evidence in the way most favorable to his clients, but I want you to
listen for a few things when he is talking to you. I think there is a very definite explanation
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Perini " ' the court held that comment by the prosecutor on the failure
of a co-defendant to take the stand was prejudicial to the defendant. '9
2.

Presumptions

In Lothridge v. United States220 the appellant challenged the
instruction given the jury pursuant to a statutory presumption to the
effect that the possessor of certain drugs knew that they were
unlawfully imported. 2 The jury instruction read:
[w]henever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is
shown to have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such
possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction
22
of the jury.
The appellant contended that a fair reading of this instruction would
lead the jury to conclude that the defendant must personally explain
the possession of the drugs, which resulted in penalizing him for
electing not to testify. The court, however, found that elsewhere in
the instruction the judge had unequivocally admonished the jury that
the failure of the defendant to testify did not create any presumption
223
against him and should not weigh in the slightest against him.
Thus, concluded the court, to reach the conclusion suggested by the
defendant, the court would have to assume the jury had ignored the
needed by him in order for you to make the proper determination. I think you are entitled to
hear from the defendants as to why Attorney Weitzman would come in and would testify that
this document was drawn up between the hours of nine and five, whereas Mrs. Harris and Mrs.
Holbrook testified that it was drawn up in their presence with the secretary there, without the
lawyer being present. Why is there this inconsistency?" Id. at 373 (emphasis added).
218. 437 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1971).
219. See also Kinser v. Cooper, 413 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1969), discussed in 1969 Survey
at 459-60. Cf United States v. Wells, 431 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 997
(1970).
220. 441 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1971).
221. "Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to have or
to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence
to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the
jury." 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1956). The constitutionality of this statute was sustained in Turner v.
United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1969).
222. 441 F.2d at 921.
223. "1 charge you that the failure of a defendant to take the witness stand and testify
in his or her own behalf does not create any presumption whatever against such defendant, and
I further charge you that you must not permit that fact to weigh in the slightest degree against
the defendants." Id. at 922.
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latter portion of the instruction, an assumption the court would not
entertain. While analytically the latter charge may extinguish any
ambiguity in the meaning of the earlier instruction, the distinction
may not be so clear to a jury receiving an oral charge. Certainly it
would be preferable that any instructions on presumptions include an
internal clarification that precludes a possible understanding that the
silence of the accused supports the presumption.
3. Confessions
a. Spontaneous Utterances. The warnings required under
Miranda v. Arizona224 are inapplicable as a pre-requisite to the admissibility of a statement of the accused typified as a spontaneous
utterance.225 This possibility arose in three recent cases in Tennessee.
In Spears v. States,22 the sheriff arriving at the scene of the offense
observed the defendant standing over the deceased holding a pistol.
He asked what happened, and the defendant responded, "I shot him."
In Campbell v. State,2 2 as the defendant, one of three participants
in an armed robbery was being arrested, he said, "It wasn't none of
me. They made me go with them." In Brewer v. State,22 8 the petitioner ran out into the street and waved down the police. When one
of the officers asked, "What's going on?" the petitioner responded
that he did not mean to shoot the boy. In all three instances the
Tennessee court held that the statements were spontaneous utterances, unaffected by Miranda.
b. Custodial Interrogation. Normally the notion of custodial
interrogation arouses images of questioning by policemen in the stationhouse, but in Underwood v. State,22 9 the application of the
Miranda requirements to interrogation by a judge arose. A clergyman reported to the trial judge that the minor daughter of the defendant had told him the defendant had been having sexual relations with
him. The judge had the girl brought to his office, and she confirmed
the story. The defendant, who operated a concession stand in the
courthouse, was called into an office where he found the judge and
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1970 Survey at 231.
466 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
469 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
470 S.W.2d 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
465 S.W.2d 884 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
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two officers. The judge said, "Now, we're going to have to get all of
our marbles on the table." He told the defendant his daughter was
in the next office and repeated her accusation. The defendant then
made a full oral confession which, after he left, the judge reduced to
writing which he and the two officers witnessed. The court held that
the defendant had been "deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way and the Miranda warnings were required." ' Thus the
confession was improperly admitted.
c. Impeachment. A substantial in-road upon the Miranda protection was produced by Harris v. New York."' The petitioner was
charged with twice selling heroin to an undercover agent. Testifying
in his defense, the petitioner denied the first sale and submitted that
the purported second transaction actually involved a transfer of a
packet of baking powder rather than heroin. On cross-examination,
the petitioner was asked if he had not made certain statements, inconsistent with his present testimony, immediately following his arrest.
The petitioner indicated he did not remember any of the questions
or answers. The statements attributed to the petitioner had been
obtained from him in violation of the Miranda requirements. The
trial judge instructed the jury that the statements attributed to the
petitioner were to be considered only for purposes of determining his
credibility, not as evidence of guilt. The petitioner was found guilty
on one of the two counts.
While conceding that the statements were inadmissible as evidence of guilt because of the Miranda violations, the Court significantly observed, "Petitioner makes no claim that the statements
made to the police were coerced or involuntary. 1232 The Court reasoned that merely because evidence was inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief did not mean that it was inadmissible for all
purposes, "provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence
satisfies legal standards.2 133 The Court then quoted from Walder v.
United States, 34 a case upholding the use of illegally seized evidence
for impeachment:
It is one thing to say the Government cannot make an affirmative
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 886.
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
Id. at 224.
Id.
347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say the
defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the
Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and
provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his un1

truths.2 5

Concluding that Miranda could not "be perverted into a license to
use perjury by way of a defense, ' 26 the conviction was affirmed.
The disconcerting implication of Harris,perhaps far more significant than the result, is the recognition of a distinction between
confessions inadmissible because involuntary and confessions inadmissible because obtained in violation of the Miranda standard.
While it cannot be gainsaid that even where Miranda has been complied with defacto involuntariness may still be shown,237 it does not
follow that Miranda is properly to be viewed as an alternative to
voluntariness. Rather, the spirit of Miranda would appear to be that
if certain procedural safeguards are not satisfied, there arises a conclusive presumption of involuntariness. Thus, a confession obtained
in violation of Miranda is by definition an involuntary confession.
Harris apparently held that this is not a proper understanding of
Miranda;the failure to comply with that decision does not render the
evidence untrustworthy. Having taken this step, it may next be
argued that if a confession is "reliable" enough for impeachment
purposes, why is it not equally reliable for purposes of substantive
proof. Having pointed itself in this direction, the Court may find such
an argument irresistible. The explanation for the about-face would be
that Miranda was never intended as an absolute rule but merely as a
suggested practice to achieve the standard of voluntariness. 2 3 Thus
the Court would be ready to accept the position of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 which had as its objective
39
the overruling of Miranda.1
From an analytical perspective the holding in Harris is wholly
235. Id. at 65.
236. 401 U.S. at 226.
237. See 1970 Survey at 230-31.
238. Here the Court could quote the Miranda loophole: "lUlnless other fully effective
means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous
opportunity to exercise it." 384 U.S. at 444.
239. After stating, inter alia, the Miranda requirements: "The presence or absence of any
of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession." 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968).
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indefensible, a point effectively made by the dissent.24 ° First, the
Walder case is clearly distinguishable, because the illegally seized
evidence was there used to impeach the testimony of the defendant
on matters collateral to the crime charged. Testifying in his own
defense to a narcotics charge, the defendant said he had never possessed narcotics in his entire life. Thereafter, the prosecution was
allowed to introduce the evidence seized two years previous which
was totally unrelated to the present charge. In sustaining the admissibility of the evidence solely for the purpoe of impeachment, the Court
was careful to distinguish the situation where the testimony of the
defendant was a denial of complicity in the crime charged. 4 , The
majority, while conceding this distinction in the Walder case, dis'
missed it as not "a difference in principle."242
Second, as the dissent observed, the answer to the issue in the
present case is provided by Miranda, itself. Arguing from the broad
243 that the use of the privipolicy perspective of Griffin v. California
lege against self-incrimination should not be fettered in any way, the
Court observed,
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from
being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner . . .
[SItatements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant
are often used to impeach his testimony at trial . . These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and
may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver
required for any other statement.244

Again, the point was conceded by the majority, the feeble response
being "discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to the Court's

240. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall. Justice Black also
dissented.
241. "Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet
the accusation against him. He must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him
without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence
illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief." 347 U.S. at 65.
242. 401 U.S. at 225. It may be argued that the rejection of this distinction casts serious
doubt upon the continued viability of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). There the
Court held that a jury could not be expected to engage in the "mental gymnastics" of considering a confession as evidence of guilty of but one co-defendant when it inculpated another. In
Harris, the Court apparently held that a jury can consider a confession only for purposes of
impeachment, notwithstanding its relevance to the proof of the crime charged.
243. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
244. 384 U.S. at 476-77 (emphasis as added in the Harris dissent).
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holding and cannot be regarded as controlling." '45
d. State Action. From time to time it becomes incumbent
upon the courts to reiterate the fundamental notion that constitutional protections serve as inhibitions only against state action. In
West v. State4 ' the defendant objected to the testimony of a newspaper reporter who had interviewed him while in jail. The statements
made by the defendant had been exculpatory but were inconsistent
with other statements attributed to him, also put in evidence. Having
determined that the reporter was not functioning as an undercover
agent and that the defendant had voluntarily talked with him understanding the purpose of the interview, the court held the evidence
admissible.
J.

Fair Trial

1. Change of Venue
In Groppi v. Wisconsin247 the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a state statute restricting the right to a change of
venue to felony prosecutions. The prosecution contended that the
accused misdemeanant was not entitled to a jury trial under the
fourteenth amendment and therefore he could not complain in this
fashion when he was afforded a trial by jury. The Court held it
mattered not whether the defendant had a right to a jury trial. The
issue was simply what the fourteenth amendment commands once a
trial by jury has been given the accused. Having reached this point,
the Court found no rational basis for assuming community prejudice
could not be aroused in a misdemeanor case and thus the judicial
machinery for a change of venue was unneeded. While it would be a
rare case in which a misdemeanor prosecution aroused passions
against the accused, this was not a sufficient reason to deny the
defendant the opportunity to prove that a change of venue was required in his case.
The reasoning of the Court is analogous to that employed in
numerous cases concerning grand jury proceedings. To date, the fifth
amendment right to an indictment by a grand jury has not been
245.
246.
247.

401 U.S. at 224.
466 S.W.2d 524 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
400 U.S. 505 (1971).

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 39

extended to the states, and therefore state prosecutions may proceed
by way of information. However, if a state elects to initiate charges
by grand jury indictment, the fourteenth amendment requires that
there be no invidious discrimination in the selection of jurors.248
2.

Presentation of Evidence

In Tennessee by statute 4 ' an accused who elects to testify in his
own behalf must be the first witness for the defense. In Harvey v.
State250 the defendant contended that this requirement impeded his
right to conduct his defense and was premised on the presumption
that an accused would not tell the truth if not required to testify first.
As a result, he submitted, the statute violated the fifth, sixth and
fourteenth amendments. In rejecting the argument the court initially
noted that the defendant had shown no prejudice resulting from the
enforcement of the rule, but that in any event the issue had been
resolved in 1893 in Clemons v. State.2 5 1 In truth, all the Clemons
court did was to observe that the state was unambiguous and contained no exceptions. That court did not speak to the constitutional
issues here raised, and not surprisingly since the fifth and sixth
amendment protections were not to be extended to the states for
another half century. The Harvey decision may simply be read as a
refusal on the part of the court to consider the merits of a constitutional assault upon the statute.
In Campbell v. State252 the defendants were charged with armed
robbery. When each testified in his behalf, he sought to adorn himself
with a stocking mask, similar to those worn by the culprits, apparently to demonstrate the difficulty of identification by the witnesses.
The trial court refused to permit them to present such demonstrative
evidence. On appeal, the court found it error to deny the defendant's
request213 but in light of the over-whelming evidence concluded it was
harmless 254
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See, e.g., Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2403 (1955).
468 S.W.2d 731 (Tenn. 1971).
92 Tenn. 282, 21 S.W. 525 (1893).
469 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
The court cited Lipes v. State, 83 Tenn. 125 (1885).
See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
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3.

Discovery

A person charged with a criminal offense may by statute inspect
and copy "books, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained
from or belonging to the defendant." '55 The privilege does not extend
to any work product or any statement of a witness other than the
defendant.2"' In McKenzie v. State57 the court. held that under the
statute an accused had no right to examine the statement of a codefendant.
A more serious problem is presented when the accused alleges
the suppression of evidence by the prosecution. In Branch v. State"8
the accused was charged with murder and claimed self-defense. He
and others testified that he and the deceased became involved in an
argument in a cafe and that the latter threatened him with a knife.
Later the defendant left the cafe, the deceased followed him brandishing the knife, and the defendant shot him. The operator of the cafe
testified that she had searched both parties when they entered the cafe
and neither was armed. Another witness for the prosecution observed
the shooting but saw no knife in the possession of the deceased. The
investigating officer reported finding no weapon at the scene. The
defendant was convicted of second degree murder. On appeal he
contended that the prosecution knew a knife was found at the scene
of the killing but withheld that fact from the defense. Passing references had been made to the knife during the course of the trial, and
at the hearing on a motion for a new trial, the prosecutor conceded
that a knife had been brought to the police by an unidentified person.
The court held that the presence of a knife was so critical to the
defense in this case that it was error for the prosecution to keep this
information from the defense, notwithstanding the fact that the evidence had not been authenticated to the extent that it would be admissible at trial. 59 Relying on Brady v. Maryland,6 0 the court held that
255. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2044 (Supp. 1971).
256. Hudgins v. State, 458 S.W.2d 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970); Elliott v. State, 454
S.W.2d 187 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
257. 462 S.W.2d 243 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
258. 469 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
259. "That information could very well have enabled defense counsel to conduct further
and possibly fruitful investigation regarding the finding of the knife. The mere fact that the
police did not get the name of the person who delivered the knife to them could not in any
way affect the duty of the Assistant District Attorney General to inform the defendant or his
counsel of the fact." Id. at 534.
260. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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this suppression of evidence amounted to a denial of due process.2 '
Nor was it necessary that there be any showing of bad faith on the
part of the prosecutor.2"2
4.

Trial by Jury

a. Membership. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment commands that there be no invidious discrimination on
the basis of race in the selection of juries.26 3 However, it does not
follow that an accused has the right to the presence of members of a
particular group on his jury; it simply must be shown that no discrimination occurred in the selection of the pool of jurors from which the
panel was selected.2" 4 Even beyond this, in Alexander v. State,6 5 the
court found no significance in the fact that only three of fity-nine
potential jurors were black, notwithstanding that 20% of the population of the county was black, where systematic exclusion was not
shown.266

K.

Double Jeopardy

1. When Attaches
Among the more significant Supreme Court decisions of the
previous year was United States v. Jorn,2 67 in which the Court was
called upon to determine the point in a criminal proceeding at which
it may be said that jeopardy has attached. The defendant was charged
with tax fraud. Five of the witnesses for the prosecution were taxpayers whom he had assisted in the preparation of their returns. After
the first witness was called, defense counsel suggested that the
witnesses be warned of their constitutional rights. While the first
261. Also cited was the concurring opinion in Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967),
wherein Justice Fortas observed that it was no answer that the evidence in question would have
been inadmissible at trial.
262. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
263. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880).
264. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1954); Johnson v. State, 456 S.W.2d 864 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 997 (1971).
265. 469 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).

266. Nevertheless, discrimination can be shown by circumstantial evidence, as in Neal
v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881), where no black had ever been summoned as a juror.
267.

400 U.S. 470 (1971).
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witness indicated he had been apprised of his rights, the trial judge
refused to permit him to testify until he had consulted an attorney.
He further inquired of the prosecutor if the remaining four witnesses
were similarly situated. The prosecutor responded that they also had
been warned of their rights, but the trial judge, feeling the warnings
might have been inadequate, proceeded to discharge the jury. The
case was set for retrial before another jury, at which point the defendant moved for a dismissal on the ground of former jeopardy.
The Supreme Court held that jeopardy had attached, and the
defendant could not beretried. While eschewing a "mechanical rule"
prohibiting retrial whenever a jury was discharged without the consent of the defendant, the Court found that the trial court had abused
its discretion in light of the assurances given him that the witnesses
had been properly warned, and in not considering the possibility of a
trial continuance. This being the case, the Court was disposed to
honor the defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal. 26 8
In sharp contrast to the Jorn decision is State v. Brooks.2 19 There
the indictment charged robbery by "use of a deadly weapon, . . . to
wit: a pistol." At the trial, however, the evidence for the state showed
that a rifle had been used. Upon discovering this discrepancy, the
prosecution moved for a directed verdict of not guilty, which was
entered. The defendants were reindicted for robbery with a rifle, their
plea of former jeopardy was overruled, and they were convicted. The
appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that the crime
charged in the second indictment was distinct from that previously
270
charged, and therefore the plea of former jeopardy was not valid.
In Dunbar v. State,2' the court held that jeopardy did not attach
where the court hearing the case lacked jurisdiction and therefore its
72
judgment was a nullity.
268. Id. at 484 [quoting from Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949)].
269. 462 S.W.2d 491 (Tenn. 1970).
270. The case is, of course, analytically distinguishable from the Jorn decision, although
the reason for Jorn would appear equally applicable here. Indeed, there may be stronger reason
to hold in favor of the defendant when it is the prosecution rather than the judge who has
blundered. The simple solution to the Brooks problem would appear to be to allow the prosecution to amend the indictment in the course of the trial, if this could be accomplished without
denying the defendant his fifth amendment right to know in advance the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
271. 470 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
272. A general sessions judge had heard a felony case.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

2.

Multiple Offenses

Tennessee courts continued to frown upon multiple convictions
arising from a single criminal transaction,"' even though such results
would not appear compelled by the protection against double jeop5
ardy." 4 Thus it was held that convictions of burglary and larceny
and convictions of involuntary manslaughter and driving while intoxicated27 could not be sustained when arising out of the same facts. On
the other hand, in Hayes v. State,"' where the defendant first committed robbery and thereafter attempted rape, convictions for both
were sustained.
3.

Retrial

While North Carolina v. Pearce1 8 all but eliminated the possibility of giving a defendant a greater sentence on retrial after his previous conviction was reversed, Tennessee courts have held that the
rule is inapplicable when punishment at the retrial was determined
by a jury rather than a judge, on the assumption that the jury would
not know of the prior conviction or sentence. 279 In one instance, however, a writ of habeas corpus was issued by a federal court which saw
no distinction to be drawn for constitutional purposes.2 80 A recent
state decision, Brown v. State,2 1' has again recognized the distinction,
acknowledging the intervening federal decision, but observing that
the state court was not bound by rulings of lower federal courts.

273. See 1970 Survey at 242-43.
274. See. e.g., Gore v. United Stats, 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
275. Lawson v. Neil, 319 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); McAfee v. State, 463 S.W.2d
141 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
276. Ritter v. State, 462 S.W.2d 247 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
277. 470 S.W.2d 950 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
278. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
279. Britt v. State, 455 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969); State ex rel. Pinkard v.
Henderson, 452 S.W.2d 908 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 946 (1971),
discussed in 1970 Survey at 245-46.
280. Pinkard v. Neil, 311 F. Supp. 711 (M.D. Tenn. 1970). See also Pendergrass v. Neil,
9 CRIM. L. REP. 2152 (M.D. Tenn., April I, 1971), reaffirming Pinkard.
281. 470 S.W.2d 39 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).

